Contracts--Third Party Beneficiary Contract--When a Right Vests in a Donee Beneficiary by Morris, Leslie W., II
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 44 | Issue 4 Article 7
1956
Contracts--Third Party Beneficiary Contract--
When a Right Vests in a Donee Beneficiary
Leslie W. Morris II
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Contracts Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Morris, Leslie W. II (1956) "Contracts--Third Party Beneficiary Contract--When a Right Vests in a Donee Beneficiary," Kentucky Law
Journal: Vol. 44 : Iss. 4 , Article 7.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol44/iss4/7
KmNTUcKY LAw JouENAL
aquae at the middle of the stream.1 Either view on this point would
work substantial justice if strictly adhered to, but the decision reached
is the better one since a boundary marked by the center of a stream
is morelikely to be a stable line than one dependent on location of
the center of the main channel.
As to the procedure for locating the center of the stream, the
instant decision places Kentucky in the minority.17 The filum aquae
is located by measuring from low water mark to low water mark
rather than by the majority rule of measuring from the water mark at
the ordinary stage. It is submitted that the minority view is the
sounder view. Since one of the reasons for giving riparian owners
rights in stream beds is to establish their unquestioned right and
access to the water, it is better that the filum aquae be reckoned from
low rather than normal stage because if measured at normal stage, it
is quite possible that at low water an owner on one side could be
entirely cut off from the actual stream.
The sound decision reached in this case will be of future im-
portance where the ownership of minerals lying under stream beds is
involved, where accretion problems arise, where there is a question of
the location of property for tax purposes, where a dispute arises as to
the amount of land in a described boundary, and also where the
riparian owner is required to predict how far into the stream he may
take the water for his own use, such as irrigation.
JAMEs FRAwcis MmLER
CoNTRActs-THD PARTY BENEFICAHY CoNTRAr-WIIEN A RIGHT
VESTS IN A DoNEE BENIc~IRY-In 1947, the defendant's fifty year old
father, John Rhodes, entered into a five year employment pact with
American Association. This arrangement provided for certain annuity
payments to the defendant, a minor, in the event Rhodes died before
the age of sixty-five while in the employ of the Association. The con-
tract was to be mutually renewable and contained a clause which pro-
16 The center or thread of the stream for navigational purposes is called the
thalweg. For the definition, see 3 ArmucAN LAvW OF PROPERTY 247 (1952) note,
Thalweg: "The thalweg is a navigational term. It is the thread or center of the
main channel, the middle of the navigable channel, the deepest part of the most
navigable channel, or the track taken by boats in their course downstream. It is
often the boundary between states but is only occasionally a private boundary."
17 3 AmmacA LAw OF PRoPE TY 247 (1952) Iilum aquae said to be ....
the geographical center line of the stream... [measured] at the ordinary stage of
water.... ; 11 C.J.S. 578 (1938); "Although there is authority that under certain
circumstances the thread of the stream is midway between the shore lines when
the water is at its low stage, it is generally held that the line will be so drawn
when the water is at its natural stage at medium height'. See cases cited.
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vided that "in view of the possibility of fluctuations in the value of
Pounds Sterling or Dollars, either party hereto may request a re-
negotiation of this contract at any time during the term thereof." In
1950, Rhodes entered into a new agreement whereby, among other
things, the plaintiff, his second wife, was named as the beneficiary in
the place of the defendant. Rhodes died in 1951 and the plaintiff
brought suit on the 1950 contract. The lower court held that the
first contract had been effectively rescinded "in the manner therein
provided" and that the plaintiff was entitled to recover under the 1950
agreement. Held: Reversed. Parties to a contract for the benefit of a
third person cannot rescind the contract without the latter's consent,
and thereby deprive him of its benefits, after he has accepted, adopted,
or acted upon the contract, unless the right to rescind is reserved in
the contract. Since the defendant is an infant, his acceptance of a con-
tract for his benefit is presumed. The provision pertaining to "re-
negotiation" did not amount to a reservation of power to rescind the
contract without the consent of the third party beneficiary. Rhodes v.
Rhodes, 266 S.W. 2d 790 (Ky. 1953).
Despite some unfortunate language which tends to confuse the
holding,1 this case emerges as a statement of Kentucky's view as to
when a donee benefieiary's right vests, thereby preventing a rescission
of the contract without his consent. Though the court's cursory re-
jection of the "renegotiation clause" as inclusive of the right of rescis-
sion may well be questioned,2 it is of even more importance to consider
the court's attitude toward the legal position of the donee beneficiary
in the absence of such a reservation.
1 In the latter stages of the court's holding, it is asserted that the parties "did
not in reality rescind" the contract, and that references made by them in regard to
cancellation of the contract referred to the paper document rather than to the
contractual agreeemnt. It is extremely difficult to interpret these comments in
light of the court's apparent view that the parties intended to replace the original
contract with the 1950 contract, and that, therefore, although they might have
thought they were merely amending, the legal effect of their action was to cancel
the agreement.
2 It was held that the "renegotiation clause" contemplated a renegotiotion
only with respect to the amount of compensation or benefits to be paid to Rhodes.
However, as the appellant's petition for a rehearing pointed out, the court ap-
parently broadened this narrow interpretation itself, by giving silent approval to
Rhodes' change in position, i.e., his promotion from vice-president to president of
the Association. Since this had nothing directly to do with the amount of com-
pensation, it would seem to lend strength to the contention that all of the terms
changed by the mutual agreement were within the scope of the "renegotiation
clause." The contract of 1947 also expressly authorized the execution ot a new
and different contract in 1952, which may imply that the parties intended to
reserve the right to renegotiate and renew the contract before its expiration. But
see RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs sec. 142, comment (a) (1933): "The reservation
of power on the part of the promisee to change the beneficiary or otherwise to vary
the terms of a gift promise must ordinarily be expressed in specific terms .. "
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It is so well established today that a third party may sue to protect
his vested interests under a contract for his benefit, that citations to
that effect would appear unnecessary. Kentucky avowedly adopts the
majority rule that a donee beneficiary's right vests when he acquires
knowledge of the contract and assents thereto.3 Therefore, assuming
the defendant's assent, the subsequent renegotiation of the contract
which substituted the wife as the beneficiary of the annuity was in-
effective to destroy his right.
Mhat is necessary to constitute knowledge and acceptance of such
a contract? Of course, formal and express assent is suffcient. But, by
the very nature of a third party beneficiary contract, it is evident that
a formal manifestation of assent is not always possible or expected.4
In many cases what is required in the way of assent is not defined.
However, it is consistently recognized that a third party beneficiary's
assent can be implied by some overt act on his part, such as a suit on
the contract.5 It is apparently enough, therefore, that the beneficiary
knows of the contract when he initiates his action." In addition, a
broader view has gained favor which indicates that a beneficiary's
assent to a contract which confers a "benefit without burden" will be
presumed when the contract is made,7 and many courts have added
that this presumption cannot be rebutted unless the beneficiary's dis-
sent is shown."
There was no evidence in the principal case that the infant had
any knowledge of the contract for his benefit or that he expressly
agreed to or accepted its provisions. But the court presumed his ac-
ceptance of the contract, following cases which have presumed ac-
ceptance by an infant of deeds made to him, whether or not he
3 12 Am. JuR. 843 (1938). Kentucky has consistently followed the majority
rule. See Dodge's Adm'r v. Moss, 82 Ky. 441 (1884); Jones v. IHiggins, 80 Ky.
409 (1882); Spalding v. Henshaw, 80 Ky. 55 (1882). The Rhodes case has been
cited in American Trust Co. v. Catawba Sales and Processing Co. 242 N.C. 370,
88 S.E. 2d 238 (1955), as standingfor the rule that a contract made for the direct
benefit of a third person cannot be materially changed where the contract has
been accepted or acted upon. See also 4 Coamnn, CoNrnAc'rs sec. 814 (Supp.
1954), which cites the principal case.
478 Am. Jur. 841 (1938).
SWolters Village Management Co. v. The Merchants & Planters Nat'l Bank of
Sherman, 228 F. 2d 793 (5th cir. 1955); Jackman Cigar Mfg. Co. v. John Berger
& Son, 114 Ind. App. 487, 52 N.E. 2d 368 (1944); Johnson v. Central Trust Co.,
159 Ind. 605, 65 N.E. 1028 (1903). See Williston, Contracts for the Benefit of a
Third Person, 15 HARv. L. REv. 767, 799 (1902).
6 12 Am. Jun. 841 (1938) states: ". . . [Clommencement of an action [on the
contract] is both [notice of] acceptance and demand ... "
7 Waterman v. Morgan, 114 Ind. 287, 16 N.E. 590 (1888); Rogers v. Gosnell,
58 Mo. 589 (1875); Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859) (a landmark case);
Baker v. Eglin, 11 Ore. 883, 8 P. 280 (1884); 12 A_M. Jut. 841 (1938).
8 Rogers v. Gosnell, supra note 7; 12 Am. Jun. 841 (1938).
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actually knew of the gift.9 It has been generally held that the law
accepts a benefit for an infant,10 and that his acceptance will be pre-
sumed as contemporaneous with the promise." The court did not
avail itself of the opportunity to draw an analogy here to the insurance
cases. It is an almost universal doctrine that as soon as a contract of
insurance takes effect, the right of the beneficiary vests and is not
subject to abrogation. 2 Under this analogy it would have been un-
necessary to presume the third party's acceptance.
Of course, a contract for the benefit of a third person is binding
upon the contracting parties irrespective of the beneficiary's expression
of assent, unless his assent is made a condition upon which the con-
tract depends.' 3 The question is whether the beneficiary must express
his assent thereto in order to take advantage of the contract's pro-
visions or to prevent the parties from rescinding.'- Kentucky, follow-
ing the majority rule, answers this query in the affirmative. The
parties may rescind, vary, or abrogate the contract before it is ac-
cepted, adopted, or acted upon.15 A possible explanation for knowl-
edge and assent as a necessary element is the historical notion that
the beneficiary must in some way be brought into privity with the
promisor. 0
A strong minority view is that the donee beneficiary's right vests
as soon as the contract is consummated. 17 That is to say, the agree-
ment cannot be rescinded without the consent of the beneficiary, even
before the latter becomes aware of the contract or accepts it. 18 This is
0 Cassady v. Cain, 311 Ky. 179, 223 S.W. 2d 744 (1949); Mullins v. Mullins,
120 Ky. 643, 87 S.W. 764 (1905). See also Pruitt v. Pruitt, 91 Ind. 595 (1883);
Henderson v. McDonald, 84 Ind. 149 (1882).
1027 Am. Jut. 751 (1940).
"lWaterman v. Morgan, supra note 7 at 592. Cf. Phillips v. Plastridge, 107
Vt. 267, 179 A. 157 (1935) (Acceptance of a gift by a donee will be presumed,
especially where the gift is from parent to child). But see People's Bank & Trust
Co. v. Weidinger, 73 N.J. 433, 64 A. 179 (1906).
12Townsend v. Townsend, 127 Ky. 230, 105 S.W. 937 (1907). See also 2
WILLISTON, CONTRACrS 1140, 1079-1082 (1936); Page, The Power of the Con-
tracting Parties to Alter a Contract for Rendering Performance to a Third Person,
12 Wis. L. R. 141 at 180 (1937).
13 12 Am. Jun. 514 (1938).
14 Id., at 514-515. In discussing the power of parties to rescind a third party
beneficiary contract, authorities appear to make no clear distinction between the
creditor and the gift beneficiary. See 12 Am. Jun. 844 (1938); GrSuoRE, CON-
TraCTS 406 (1947); Page, supra note 12 at 183. But see infra note 19. For a
good modem discussion of third party beneficiary contracts, see The No. Nat'l
Bank of Bemidji v. Northern Minn. Natl Bank of Duluth, 70 N.W. 2d 118 (Minn.
1955).
15 Supra note 3. See also 17 C.J.S. 883 (1939).
16 CiumonE, supra note 14 at 406.
17 Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N.W. 440 (1903) (the leading
case); W.LISTON supra note 12 at 1139-1140; 12 AM. JuR. 843 (1938). For cita-
tion of cases see 81 A.L.R. 1271 at 1293 (1932). Is Supra note 17.
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the "insurance rule" and it has been urged that it be generally ap-
plied.19 The contention is that the beneficiary's right is analogous to
those arising upon a gift of property or the creation of a trust, where
the donee's right vests immediately.20
A few cases suggest that the right vests in the third party when he
merely learns of the contract for his benefit.21 Other jurisdictions have
declared that the parties can modify the contract until the beneficiary
changes his position in reliance upon the promised gift.22 It is ad-
mitted that acting upon the faith of, or in reliance upon, the contract
will defeat its rescission, but the weight of authority supports the
doctrine that something less will suffice.23
Assent, then, is the vital thing in the majority of decisions. But this
requirement seems to disintegrate when it is considered what has been
held to constitute assent or acceptance. Many courts, as noted, pre-
sume assent to a purely beneficial contract as soon as the contract is
effected. In some instances notice of assent is in some way required
and in others it is not. Where notice is not required, according to
Professor Corbin, assent is not actually required, and the donative-
right vests in the beneficiary even before he has knowledge of the
gift.24 Therefore, there is a shading of the majority rule into the
minority argument as the required assent breaks down. In fact,
one cannot escape the impression that some writers and judicial de-
cisions seem to confound this watered-down assent with the rule that
19 It is interesting to note the position taken by the RESTATEZrENT, CON-
TR~c~s sec. 142: "Unless the power to do so is reserved, the duty of the promisor
to the donee beneficiary cannot be released by the promisee or affected by any,
agremen beteenthe romse nd t prnuso . Se. 13 states: "A dis-
charge of the proisor bthe promisee in a coract or a variation thereof by
them is effective against a creditor beneficiary if, (a) the creditor beneficiary
does not bring suit upon the promise or otherwise materially change his position
in reliance thereon before he knows of the discharge or variation . . In other
words, the RESTATEMENT applies to donee beneficiary contracts the rule that the
beneficiary's right vests immediately, and applies to creditor beneficiary contracts
the rule that the promisee continues in control of his obligation so long as the
beneficiary does not change his position in reliance thereon. Williston, supra note
12, at 1060, 1061, 1144-1147, explains the RESTATEMENT attitude on the nature
of the creditor beneficiary's rights. These RESTATEMENT sections are, of course, op-
posed to the general rule. Page, supra note 12, at 183, 184, submits that the RE-
STATEMENT runs exactly contra to the "general feeling," and that there is less
reason to give the donee beneficiary an indefeasible right than to give one to the
creditor.2
o VLLISTON, supra note 12 at 1139; GmsmxorE, supra note 12 at 406-407.
21 Page, supra note 12 at 155. Cf. Gilbert v. Sanderson, 56 Iowa 349, 9 N.W.
293 (1881); Hill v. Hoeldtke, 104 Tex. 594, 142 S.W. 871 (1912).2 2 John F. Clark & Co. v. Nelson, 216 Ala. 199, 112 So. 819 (1927). See also
Page, supra note 12 at 160, 161.
23 12 Am. JuR. 841 (1938).
24 COBRBN, supra note 3 at 134-135 (1951).
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the donee beneficiary's right vests immediately. 25 Certainly from the
standpoint of the beneficiary there is little, if any, practical difference
whether his right vests immediately upon the making of the contract
or "immediately" as the by-product of the doctrine of presumed ac-
ceptance. Professor Page illustrates this blending by suggesting that
in some cases, particularly where there is a family settlement or an
infant's interests in jeopardy, the rule that the beneficiary's right
attaches when the contract is made "combines" with the contra req-
uisite of knowledge and acceptance .2  In other words, while assent is
necessary to vest a beneficiary's right, it will be presumed if the con-
tract is advantageous, and the presumption arises when the contract
is made.27
Unless a right has vested before rescission of the contract, then,
the beneficiary cannot object. In summary, it is seen that there are
actually four views as to the point of time when the right of the
beneficiary vests and is no longer subject to abrogation by the con-
tracting parties: (1) when the contract is entered into; (2) when the
beneficiary acts to his detriment in reliance upon the contract; (3)
when the beneficiary learns of the contract; (4) when the beneficiary
learns of the contract and assents thereto. The latter rule, adopted in
a majority of jurisdictions, can be arbitrarily categorized as follows in
regard to the required assent: (a) express assent; (b) assent implied
from some overt manifestation; (c) assent presumed from the bene-
ficial nature of the contract.
The general rule which the Kentucky Court of Appeals will fol-
low in a case involving a donee beneficiary is decided by the prin-
cipal case. Kentucky will undoubtedly continue to follow the majority
rule that a donee beneficiary's right vests after he has accepted,
adopted, or acted upon the contract. The decision, however, might
be interpreted on its face as meaning that only an infant's assent will
2 5 WILLISTON, supra note 12 at 1139, in discussing the minority rule that a
donee beneficiary's right vests immediately upon the making of the contract, states
that since a gift is a pure benefit, there is no reason why the donee's assent should
not be presumed, unless and until he expresses dissent. The confusion which
exists among authorities as to how to categorize the doctrine of "presumed ac-
ceptance" is illustrated by the various interpretations of Waterman v. Morgan,
supra note 7. This case seems to hold that where the beneficiary is an infant, no
formal or express acceptance of the contract is necessary, but that since the con-
tract is beneficial, his acceptance will be presumed when the transaction is closed.
Williston cites this case as supporting his contention (above) for the minority
rule. Other authorities apparently consider the case as representative of a form
of the majority rule. See 12 Am. Jur. 841 (1938); Page, supra note 12 at 155.
In addition, the Waterman case has been cited as illustrative of the rule that the
third party beneficiary's right vests when he learns of it. See SmssoN, CoNRrAcTs
322 (1954).
26 Page, supra note 12 at 155. 27 Ibid.
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be presumed. It remains to be seen whether the "presumed accept-
ance" in this case will be reaffirmed and applied to any donee bene-
ficiary.
LEsia W. MomUS II
CmmIINAL PROCEDURE-RIGirT TO CouNsEL-NECEssrrY THAT DEND~m'r
HAVE Am OF AN ACCOUNTANT IN A COMPLEX TAx PRosEcUTnoN-De-
fendant, a notorious gambler, was indicted for filing false and fraudu-
lent income tax returns. Defendant had no assets at the time of in-
dictment or at the time of trial, since all his property was subject to
jeopardy assessments and tax liens in favor of the Treasury Depart-
ment.' It was undisputed that the services of a skilled accountant
were necessary in order to prepare an effective defense. The trial
court, therefore, ordered the government to release some of defendant's
funds to enable him to hire an accountant. The government having
refused to do so, the trial court dismissed the indictment. United
States v. Brodson, 136 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wisc. 1955).
The trial court's opinion contains an excellent summary of the law
which has been developed on the Constitutional right of a defendant
to have counsel for his defense.2 Viewing the instant case in the light
of the recent enlargements of the constitutional right to counsel,3 the
Court felt justified in extending protection to the defendant. In reach-
ing this result, the Court was forced to distinguish the case of O'Con-
nor v. United States,4 a case reaching a contrary result. The Court
did this on the grounds that in the O'Connor case the defendant's
funds, though attached at the time of the trial, has been unencum-
bered for some twenty-two months after the indictment, and that the
defendant had therefore had adequate time to hire accounting help
before his funds were, in effect, attached.
The Court's primary reason for its position was the apparent un-
1 INT. REV. CODE of 1939, sec. 3670-3672. (Now INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
sec. 6321-6326, 6331.)
2 Most of the Court's discussion, however, centered around the 'lack of due
process" inherent in the government's action here. In other words the Court
views the case primarily as a Fifth Amendment case, rather that as a Sixth Amend-
ment case, although the Constitutional right to counsel, in the Federal courts is
granted by the latter Amendment. It is believed this was caused by the fact that
most of the cases discussed were state cases, brought under the Fourteenth
Amendment, which like the Fifth, contains a "due process" clause.
3 In the opinion of the writer, it is of considerable significance that the trend
in the law has been to broaden the scope of this particular constitutional right. In
conjunction with both this footnote and footnote 2, see Note, 44 Ky. L.J. 103
(1955) and note, 38 Ky. L.J. 317 (1950).
4 203 F. 2d 301 (4th Cir. 1953).
